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Abstract 
This paper describes the research and progress made during FY09 at the 
Naval Postgraduate School on a Software Systems Safety Review Panel (SSSTRP) 
Requirements Framework.  Accomplishments made in FY09 include the discovery of 
the primary causes for the high level of vendor failure rates during the SSSTRP 
process.  Research showed that the lack of structure associated with the vendor-
provided Technical Review Package (TRP) led to inconsistent documentation and 
standards in the SSSTRP process of evaluating the vendor's software safety risk.  
The development of a domain-specific Requirements Framework designed to work 
with the SSSTRP process will both help the vendor fully understand the measurable 
requirements for the TRP, and the SSSTRP members to understand the measurable 
standard by which the TRP is evaluated.  This process should result in a reduction of 
SSSTRP failures. 
This paper further discusses the application of the NASA Software Safety 
Standard to Naval Weapons Systems development processes. This development is 
dependent on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software in order to meet deadline 
and cost requirements; however, this dependency poses a problem, as commercial 
programs are not commonly designed to a high standard for safety-critical 
applications. The NASA Software Safety Standard is one of the most robust 
software safety assessment standards that can be identified and, thus, provides an 
ideal basis for assessment of COTS software components for Naval requirements. 
This report identifies the portions of the NASA Software Safety Standard that are 
relevant to the assessment of COTS software and proposes a guideline of how 
these standards can be applied to the Naval weapons systems development. This 
discussion includes both an analysis of the standard itself and justification of the 
need for safety-critical applications within the Naval Weapons Systems 
development. It also includes a brief discussion of the program, and identification 
and application of the appropriate portions of the standard to Naval weapons 
systems development (including the identification of checklists and other features 
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that must be integrated into the system). This report can be used to identify specific 
ways in which the NASA Software Safety Standard can be applied to Naval 
requirements, as well as to identify potential gaps in the standard that could be 
addressed by the Navy in an extension of this standard. 
Keywords: Open Architecture, Software Requirements, Software Safety, 
COTS Safety Analysis 
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Introduction 
The use of commercial software in safety-critical systems within some 
contexts (such as the Naval weapons system development program) is increasingly 
common, as it has been shown to be highly cost-effective and may speed system 
development time (NASA, 2004a, p. 269). However, in some cases safety issues are 
not even considered; instead, off-the-shelf software is used by default—such as with 
operating systems, low-level real-time operational code (for example, BIOS 
software), and seemingly non-complex systems such as word processing or e-mail. 
However, the use of these systems in the business environment does yield some 
degree of difficulty in that their use is not strongly controlled and does pose a risk to 
safety-critical systems. 
One of the most complex issues in using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
software for safety-critical applications is that, in most cases, this software is 
designed with commercial goals in mind. This means that the software is not ideal in 
terms of functionality, but instead meets the majority of the needs of its users in 
terms of both functionality and safety, with improvements added as an incremental 
process. This software development methodology reduces the cost and time 
required for development and allows commercial firms to release products in a 
timely manner.  In many cases, the potential for failure is not necessarily a 
problem—commercial and other enterprises can often sustain a brief service 
interruption or endure difficulties caused by software that is not perfectly functional in 
a given area. However, for safety-critical software or security-critical software, this 
approach to commercial software development can be highly problematic and 
drastically reduce the utility of the software program. In many cases, safety-critical 
and security-critical software applications are designed from scratch in order to meet 
the enhanced safety requirements and security framework requirements that allow 
the systems to operate at higher levels of safety and security.  
In some cases, however, this approach is neither necessary nor desirable. 
For example, ongoing development of the Naval Weapons Systems programs is 
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increasingly reliant on COTS software (as well as hardware) components, which are 
integrated into air and sea weapons commands as well as into command and control 
centers across the Navy (Friedman, 2006, p. 100). This integration of COTS 
software components provides a much faster and, in many ways, more robust 
means of integrating and upgrading systems; however, it does pose some security 
risks. Foremost among these risks is the lack of a clear standard governing 
assessment of the safety and security of COTS software components.  
There are some standards that have been developed for analysis of safety-
critical software that could be applied. Foremost among these standards is the 
NASA Software Safety Standard, which was developed for and is applied to all 
NASA software development projects (including internal software development, as 
well as COTS software components). This Standard addresses the more stringent 
quality and safety requirements needed for software that will be deployed in 
situations in which human lives are at stake. It is highly robust and has been proven 
in a number of safety-critical solutions, and thus was selected as the most 
appropriate choice for this situation. This report discusses the needs of the Naval 
Weapons Systems development program in brief, analyzes the NASA Software 
Safety Standard, and determines how this Standard can most effectively be applied 
to the development situation at hand. It then identifies potential gaps in the Standard 
and provides recommendations for filling those gaps. The goal of this discussion is 
to provide a clear guideline for application of the NASA Software Safety Standard to 
COTS-based development in the Naval Weapons System program. 
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The Naval Weapons System Program 
Naval weapons systems are based in network-centric communications and 
technologies (Friedman, 2006, p. vii). Surveillance, communication and monitoring 
networks are used to channel information to the people operating the system, 
providing real-time feedback and awareness of situational aspects outside the reach 
of his or her own senses. According to Friedman (2006), active development is 
ongoing in a wide range of systems—including surveillance and communication, 
combat direction systems, radar, electro-optical sensors, shipboard guns and gun 
systems, strategic strike systems, antisubmarine and antiaircraft systems, electronic 
warfare, and mines and mine countermeasures. These systems each rely on an 
integrated system of software that handles communication, sensory and targeting 
capabilities, and other tasks. Because these systems are used in safety-critical 
situations, and their failure could mean a highly disastrous outcome for the operator 
of the system (as well as others that are depending on him/her), the need for safety-
critical engineering design standards is clear. Within these systems, the software 
should be as robust and well designed and engineered as the hardware on which it 
is based. 
The Naval Open Architecture and Use of COTS Software 
Naval weapons system design is based in the Naval Open Architecture. The 
strategic goals of the Naval Open Architecture include “Encourage competition and 
collaboration […] build modular designs and disclose data to permit evolutionary 
designs, [...] build interoperable joint warfighting applications and ensure secure 
information exchange […] identify or develop reusable application software […] [and] 
ensure lifecycle affordability” (Department of the Navy, 2009, p. 2). Avoidance of 
COTS obsolescence is a major component of the goal of lifecycle affordability . One 
of the major components of the Naval Open Architecture strategy is lowering 
development cost and time by integrating COTS software wherever possible, and 
then using custom software to develop a modular system that can be rapidly 
redeveloped or updated if required (Department of the Navy, 2009). This system has 
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been in place since 2004, and a large number of operational weapons systems have 
been developed either wholly or partially using COTS software components 
(Department of the Navy, 2008). Some of these systems include SONAR systems, 
onboard ship management and communication systems, and surface ship 
directional systems, among many others (Friedman, 2006, pp. 107,119). This 
program has proved to be highly effective in terms of both cost savings and 
efficiency. For example, one SONAR cabinet system developed using primarily 
COTS technology was found to be less than a quarter of the cost of the MilSpec 
custom-designed alternative (p. 667).  
The use of COTS hardware and software has become extremely common in 
Naval weapons system design, as discussed above. However, there is still no single 
safety standard for integration of COTS software components, and safety of 
software is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This lack is particularly problematic 
because software quality testing is not as straightforward as hardware safety 
evaluation; its complexity can hamper attempts to determine quality and reliability. 
By instituting a single standard of software safety, decision-makers would provide an 
increased level of safety and control of COTS component integration.  
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The NASA Software Safety Standard 
One highly viable candidate standard for integration into Naval weapons 
systems development is the NASA Software Safety Standard. The NASA Software 
Safety Standard was developed for NASA by the Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance, and is used to assess software risk in all programs used within NASA’s 
systems (NASA, 2004b, p. 1). Specifically, it is applied in the following situations: 
Safety-critical systems that include software must be evaluated for software’s 
contribution to the safety of the system during the concept phase, and prior to 
the start, or in the early phases, of the acquisition or planning for the given 
software. Unless the evaluation proves that the software is not involved in the 
system safety, this Standard is to be followed. (NASA, 2004b, p.  1)  
Safety requirements that are addressed by this Standard include process-
oriented and technical requirements (p. 1). Both kinds of safety requirements must 
be met. Technical requirements are not specified by the Standard, but are instead 
identified by the manager of the software development process during the 
requirements and design phase of the project (p. 1). The Standard specifies only the 
process-oriented requirements of the system. As the document states, use of the 
Standard for process-oriented aspects of software safety does not preclude the 
requirement for the development and verification of the system to address technical-
oriented software safety issues. However, the process standards that are included 
are designed to encompass the determination of what level of software safety is 
required.  
The scope of the NASA Software Safety Standard includes: 
 Identification of the need for software safety and requirements 
generation, 
 
 Consideration of software safety within the system design, 
 
 Discussion of software safety in project planning, management, and 
control activities, 
 
 Software safety throughout the lifecycle from requirements generation 
to operation, 
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 Assurance that all COTS and contracted software undergo software 
security evaluation and determination of its “safety contribution and 
limitations” 
 
 Inclusion of software safety verification in software verification 
processes, 
 
 Software certification requirements, and 
 
 Change and reconfiguration management during operational use 
(NASA, 2004b, p. 2). 
 
Although much of this scope can have some incidental application to COTS 
software acquisition (for example, many integration processes that involve COTS 
software do involve a degree of project management, even if this is not a formal 
software development effort), there are also provisions that apply directly to the 
acquisition and use of COTS software components. It is these areas that will be 
most interesting within this discussion.  
In order to enact the guidelines of the Software Safety Standard, NASA has 
also produced a Software Safety Guidebook (NASA, 2004a). This Guidebook 
provides operational guidelines for enacting the software security standards 
encapsulated in the Standard document. The Guidebook document includes 
technical details and information intended to guide the development of operational 
safety practices (NASA, 2004a, p. 12). The document includes not only information 
for programmers, but also information for program and project managers intended to 
ensure that these personnel understand the process and requirements of software 
safety. As such, these two documents are incontrovertibly connected, and should be 
used together in an operational software safety setting to ensure that both the 
technical demands of software safety and the need for an organizational integration 
of software safety standards are met. 
Determination of Safety-critical Systems 
The NASA Standard offers a number of criteria on which software can be 
evaluated for safety criticality. The overarching criterion is inclusion within a safety-
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critical system—in which case, all software is included, as all is presumed to be 
safety-critical unless it can be shown to not be safety-critical (NASA, 2004b, p. 14). 
Further criteria include: causing, contributing to, controlling, or mitigating a hazard; 
controlling safety-critical functions or processing safety-critical commands or data; 
either detects and reports or corrects a system in a hazardous state or mitigates 
damage from a hazardous state; or resides in the same system as a hazardous 
state (p. 15). Additionally, if the system processes or analyzes data used in a safety-
critical situation or verifies or validates other safety-critical systems, the system 
should be considered to be safety-critical (p. 15). The evaluation of safety-critical 
status extends not only to software, but also to data required to make safety-critical 
decisions (p. 15).  
Risk-mitigation Processes 
A variety of processes have been identified for risk mitigation. One of these 
processes is the isolation of safety-critical and non safety-critical software through a 
process such as partitioning. This is done in order to prevent failure of non-safety-
critical software from negatively impacting the operation of safety-critical software 
(NASA, 2004b, p. 15). The use of an evaluation process that identifies the safety-
critical nature of a given component during the conceptual phase of the project, prior 
to acquisition, is also highlighted as a means of ensuring that the appropriate 
software acquisition goals will be used (p. 15). The Standard does note that this 
evaluation can be performed by the supplier rather than the purchaser, but that if this 
is the case, it must be noted within the project plan, and the system should still be 
evaluated for the need for safety-critical software prior to the process (p. 15). The 
Standard also notes that the use of mitigation techniques (like manual operator 
overrides) should not affect the absolute determination of the appropriate level of 
software safety within the system (p. 16). This will prevent failures due to ineffective 
mitigation techniques or integration of software that is essentially unsuitable due to 
reliance on an erroneously inflated perceived value of a given mitigation technique.  
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The Process of Evaluation and Planning 
The NASA Software Safety Standard presents a specific approach to 
identifying system hazards, which must be applied to each individual project or 
acquisition (NASA, 2004b, p. 22). The first stage in this analysis is the use of 
Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHAs), which “identify potential system hazards and 
may identify which proposed subsystems contribute to, or are needed to control, 
those hazards” (p. 16). The PHA can then be used to determine where—within the 
system as a whole—safety-critical design may be required. The NASA Standard 
requires that software safety analysis should take place along side and be integrated 
into system safety analyses from the conceptual stage onwards through the system 
lifecycle (p. 16). The Standard also requires a program to record the identified 
software safety requirements together with information about software hazards and 
how they can be controlled in an appropriate document: a system safety plan, 
software management plan, software or system assurance plan, or standalone 
software safety plan (p. 16). 
The Standard also identifies software safety planning as one of the mission-
critical activities in safety-critical software development and acquisition (NASA, 
2004b, p. 21). Personnel involved in the process of software safety planning include 
software assurance engineers, project managers, and others involved in the 
development process (p. 21). The Standard recommends the establishment of a 
Software Safety Plan, which should outline the software safety process for the 
facility or project as a whole, “including organizational structure, interfaces, and the 
required criteria for analysis, reporting, evaluation and data retention to provide a 
safe product (p. 21).” It should include analysis details and scheduling for the 
project’s safety planning discussion; however, the Standard allows for the use of 
both standalone documents and documents integrated into the overall project 
management plan. NASA recommends that software safety planning should 
encompass not only the initial acquisition, but the entire software lifecycle—through 
the acquisition stage to implementation, use and maintenance (NASA, 2004b, p. 24). 
There are a variety of documents associated with the Standard for safety assurance; 
the most relevant of these documents for the purposes of COTS software include 
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the Software Safety Plan, the Software Configuration Management Plan, the 
Software Requirements Specification, the Verification and Validation Plan, Safety 
Analyses and Reports, Test Documentation, and user documentation and 
procedures (pp. 24-25). 
 The Software Safety Standard and COTS Software 
The majority of the remainder of the Software Safety Standard is dedicated to 
discussion of the software development process—which is largely irrelevant in this 
case, as software development is not part of the process of integrating COTS 
software. However, there is also an explicit discussion of the requirements for 
integration of COTS software into an existing or new software-based system. 
NASA’s position on COTS software is addressed in Section 5.12 of the Standard, 
which addresses off-the-shelf (OTS) software (including commercial and 
government off-the-shelf software components). This discussion of off-the-shelf 
software is specific to both new software acquired for the project and software that 
has been reused from previous projects in the past (2004b, p. 28). The Standard 
states,  
It is important to evaluate the differences between how the OTS or reused 
software will be used within the new system, and how it was used in previous 
systems. Differences in configuration of the software or operational constraints 
may affect the operation of the OTS/reused software, sometimes in unexpected 
ways.  (NASA, 2004b, p. 28) 
The guidelines for handling off-the-shelf software include evaluation of all 
OTS software for the “potential to impact safety-critical functions within the current 
system” (p. 28).  This includes a safety analysis process that evaluates not only the 
software’s ability to meet the level of safety required for the current project, but the 
impact of any additional functionality or the potential inclusion of the software in 
future projects (p. 28). This also includes evaluation of not only the code in and of 
itself, but also its ability to interface with other pieces of code, hardware, and the 
system as a whole (p. 28). Specifically noted is the interaction between COTS 
software and other software in the planned system, including other OTS software 
and custom-developed modules (p. 29). The Standard specifically recommends the 
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use of black-box testing in order to ensure that COTS software is equivalent in 
safety standards to in-house developed software (p. 29). (Black-box testing, or data-
driven testing, is testing of the functionality of the code without considering its 
structure, with the intention of finding non-conformances (Myers, Badgett & Thomas, 
2004, p. 9).)  NASA also notes the isolation of safety-critical and non-safety-critical 
components within the system as being particularly important for the integration of 
COTS software into safety-critical systems (NASA, 2004b, p. 35). As stated 
previously, while the needed isolation can be designed into the system from the start 
in an in-house development process, COTS software is often not designed as 
safety-critical. Thus, this may not be a natural feature of the COTS software package 
or component. As such, PMs should pay particular attention to the safety criticality of 
a system when choosing COTS components.  
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Implementation of the Software Safety Standard 
While the Software Safety Standard documentation does provide a 
perfunctory example of how to evaluate software safety risk in an operational setting, 
this document does not provide specific implementation details, but is rather more of 
a rough guideline. In order to fill this gap, NASA has also instituted a Software 
Safety Guidebook which addresses the implementation details of the Standard in 
such a way that it can serve as a template for implementation in another 
organization. Although many of the concerns throughout the Guidebook are relevant 
to the discussion of COTS software, the Guidebook also provides a specific 
discussion of the use of COTS software and software acquisition (Chapter 12 of the 
Guidebook). The highlights of this discussion are addressed below.  
Initial Acquisition and Implementation of COTS Software 
The Guidebook identifies a number of concerns with the use of COTS 
software in terms of implementation in a safety-critical system (NASA, 2004a, pp. 
270-271). These include: inadequate or inaccurate documentation that does not 
provide sufficient information for integration; no access to source code (which can 
impede appropriate safety analysis); no information about the software development 
or testing processes used; the potential that the OTS developers either do not fully 
grasp interactions within the system or don’t communicate them to the user; 
incomplete information regarding software bugs (including deliberately misleading 
statements as well as bugs that simply were not detected and corrected during the 
development process); no software analysis; and missing or extra functionality. The 
last point is particularly problematic, as it either requires the use of glueware (which 
can increase the inherent risk within a system due to its own bugs and defects) or, in 
the case of extra functionality, may pose a threat on another level. The addition of 
extra functionality that will not be used within the system is a risk; for instance: 1) 
this additional functionality may be exploited at some point in the future, or 2) 
instability within untested extra functionality may be problematic for the system itself 
(NASA, 2004a, p. 271). Because of these potential issues, the use of COTS 
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software within safety-critical designs requires extra vigilance in terms of safety 
assurance and risk management. Extra functionality can also complicate testing 
procedures. 
The Guidebook offers a specific checklist for safety-critical off-the-shelf 
applications (Appendix A), that can be referred to for specific application. (This 
inclusion is a truncated version of the checklist that contains only the main points of 
each item. Specific technical details are included in the Guidebook’s checklist, and 
PMs should refer to NASA’s text when putting this checklist into use). The checklist 
offered has specific safety-critical features highlighted, such as the ability to recover 
previous software configurations and the need for a safety-impact assessment (p. 
360). The construction of this checklist is such that , by following it during the 
assessment of a given COTS software plan, a PM could eliminate a large number of 
potentially inappropriate choices for implementation—some of which may already be 
addressed in implementation testing. For example, basic hardware and software 
compatibility is addressed within this checklist. Although it is not likely that a basic 
incompatibility between hardware and software would pass unnoticed through user 
testing explicitly calling attention to this issue will reduce the risk that a more subtle 
mismatch may go unnoticed. In this case, it is plausible that no one would otherwise 
think to validate the OTS driver software package for a COTS hardware product, and 
as driver failure has a strong potential to affect system safety, this compatibility is 
likely to be highly important.  
The Software Safety Guidebook offers a number of specific recommendations 
regarding the acquisition process for COTS software. First, it specifies that all COTS 
software residing on the same system as a safety-critical application needs to be 
carefully examined and, if necessary, partitioned off from the resources used by the 
safety-critical application—regardless of whether or not the COTS software itself will 
be used within a safety-critical context (p. 272). The Guidebook further specifies 
that, if possible, non safety-critical software should not be included on a safety-
critical platform at all, in order to manage the potential risk of interference at the 
highest level (p. 272). However, this rule obviously does not apply for COTS 
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software that will be used in the implementation of safety-critical systems. In order to 
deal with this case, the NASA Guidebook offers a number of suggestions for 
analyzing the potential candidates for inclusion and determining which software 
product is most likely to be appropriate for the application required. The first 
suggestion is that the IEEE Standard for Software Safety Plans (IEEE 1228 ) should 
be integrated into the analysis of the COTS software package. Vendor and package-
specific recommendations include discussion of the stability and accessibility of the 
software package and the vendor as a whole (NASA, 2004a, p. 272). For example, 
the checklist addresses the niche that will be filled within the system, the 
responsiveness of the vendor, and the user base of the software—as well as a wide 
variety of other technical and operational requirements for the effective use of the 
software (p. 272). By using these criteria to assess and evaluate the software prior 
to engaging in a formal evaluation of the product, a PM is likely to save a great deal 
of time and effort in terms of determining overall viability of the software package. 
In addition to evaluation of the COTS software itself, there is also the problem 
of integration of COTS components into the system. The NASA Guidebook (2004a) 
also addresses this issue, discussing details of implementation and testing of 
glueware, firewalls, and of the composite COTS-glueware  system (p. 277). One 
particular problem noted in NASA’s text is the issue of extra functionality or dormant 
code within the COTS code base. It states, “The more dormant code there is in the 
OTS software, the more likely it is to ‘trigger’ accidentally” (p. 277). The Guidebook 
offers a number of technical implementation details regarding this stage of the 
documentation, but the main point of the discussion is that, in addition to testing the 
COTS software in isolation, PMs must also evaluate the system as a whole.  
NASA’s text identifies a number of specific tests that should be performed 
both for COTS software in isolation and for the system as a whole; as the Guidebook 
notes, if they are performed for the software package, they should be performed 
again following integration of the COTS software into the system (p. 280). These 
tests include software fault tree (including faults and dormant code in the COTS 
software); timing, sizing, and throughput tests; interdependence and independence 
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analyses; design constraint, code interface, and code data analyses; and interrupt 
and test coverage analyses (pp. 280-281). By using these tests both throughout the 
system and specifically focused on the COTS software, PMs can help to prevent the 
potential for negative interactions between COTS components and the remainder of 
the system.  
Safety throughout the Lifecycle 
It is important to note, however, that this checklist and the notes above are 
appropriate only for initial implementation. In order to provide guidance throughout 
the software lifecycle, the Software Safety Guidebook also addresses issues of 
software operations and maintenance. COTS software is subject to rapid changes 
and upgrades from the supplier in order to fix bugs, add or remove functionality, 
adapt to changes in the underlying hardware, or deal with changes in other 
components (such as operating system patches) that change the operational 
environment of the COTS software (p. 200). In some cases, the analysis of these 
changes can be even more complex than the initial system configuration, and may 
involve a more thorough examination of the software. Some of the components that 
may have changed during a software update include the API, interface to glueware, 
functional details (additional functionality or removed functionality), interfaces to 
hardware or software already in place, required upgrades (such as memory 
increases), the way in which the upgrade will be performed, the potential to test the 
upgrade prior to implementation, and a number of other differences (p. 200). NASA’s 
suggestion to COTS upgrades states, “The first and best choice regarding COTS 
upgrades is to ignore them. If you do not change that software, nothing in your 
system needs to be changed” (p. 202). However, the Guidebook does recommend 
acquiring the software if no upgrades are going to be planned by the vendor, in order 
to guard against the potential of COTS software obsolescence (p. 202). This may 
become relevant if future changes to the operating environment require additional 
changes to the COTS component to keep it safe. The Guidebook also recommends 
strict configuration management control in order to allow for reproduction of previous 
configurations. It states that this management should extend not only to COTS 
software packages, but to all supporting compilers, libraries, source code bodies, 
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kernels, and other software structures (p. 202). This will enable reconstruction of 
older systems if they turn out to be needed for a rollback to a stable older version, as 
well as ensuring that the overall implementation of the system remains consistent 
and as initially planned.  
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Application of the NASA Software Safety Standard 
to the Naval Weapons System Program 
The above discussion regarding the application of the NASA Software Safety 
Standard to the Naval weapons systems development program does not uncover 
any significant roadblocks for integration. It is likely that the program will require 
some degree of modification in order to be consistent with existing documentation 
and logging requirements, and that other requirements will be implemented on a 
project basis. However, the basic elements of the NASA Standard are sufficient for 
providing an inital systematic approach to risk analysis for use by the Naval 
development system. The table below addresses specific requirements of the 
Software Safety Standard (derived in relation to COTS software components) and 
discusses how they may be implemented within an existing system. The most 
important element of this Standard for the use of COTS software is the OTS 
software safety checklist (Appendix A). On this checklist, the first three items are 
essential for projects with potentially life-threatening implications, while the 
remainder of the checklist refers primarily to areas of the software that are still 
critical, but will not directly affect the outcomes of life-threatening hazards (p. 360). 
However, the recommendation of this report is that PMs should consider all items on 
this checklist, and should garner expert opinion on the ramifications of the software’s 
risk-assessment profile.  
Document Brief Description 
Software Safety 
Standard 
Provides the general terms of NASA’s standard and briefly 
identifies process-related implementation details 
Software Safety 
Guidebook 





Provides a clear risk assessment checklist for OTS software 
(including COTS, GOTS, MOTS, etc.) that outlines required 
software safety decisions. 
IEEE 1228 Standard that designates the content of Software Safety Plans, 
including specific requirements for previously developed (or 
reused) software and COTS and other acquired software 
Table 1. Index to Supporting Documents 
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There are no specific implementation details within this Software Safety 
Standard that must be changed or modified. However, the Standard may be 
extended as needed to support additional consideration of specific Naval safety 
requirements. 
Future Research 
One of the main issues with the current implementation of the NASA Software 
Safety Standard is that  it provides little clear guidance on methods for identification 
of technical requirements for software safety or identification of safety-critical 
systems. In most cases, these choices may be clear (as there are specific situational 
guidelines that identify the areas in which software should be incontrovertibly safety-
critical). However, in other cases, there may be a more subtle approach to determine 
the safety-critical features of the software system. In this case, there is no specific 
method specified by the standard to identify safety-critical features. Instead, the 
document recommends the use of skilled project management personnel and safety 
engineering personnel to provide insight into how and when given software 
applications are likely to require safety-critical design. By combining expert oversight 
into the design of the eventual system, with the use of the clear cut requirements laid 
out by the Standard, a PM will best meet the requirement for software safety in 
critical systems. 
A second problematic issue is organizational support for the software safety 
process. The Standard notes that internal organizational support for software 
safety—including adequate assignment of resources for requirements determination, 
evaluation, testing and other needs—is essential to ensure software safety in safety-
critical systems (NASA, 2004b, p. 20). This includes not only organizational support 
for the project itself, but organizational support and authority given to project 
management and technical leaders to ensure that the software safety demands of 
the given systems are taken into account (p. 20). However, obtaining such support 
may be problematic in a setting that does not assign this level of authority to the 
project managers and others involved in the safety determination. As this may be the 
case with some Naval software development processes, this should be addressed 
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before applying the Standard to specific Navy safety assessments, since the 
Standard is highly dependent on individual authority and management of safety 
issues and responses.  
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Recommendations and Conclusion 
The overall approach of the NASA Software Safety Standard to COTS 
software component integration is much stricter and more conservative than the 
current Navy approach to this integration. In the Standard, COTS software 
integration is noted as being risky and requiring intensive scrutiny and increased 
oversight, as well as justifying potential concessions—such as gaining access to the 
source code and maintaining the source code in a fixed state (not implementing 
upgrades or bug fixes if the issue is not deemed to be a problem within the system). 
The NASA Guidebook, intended to guide implementation of the system, is 
considerably more conservative—stating that in most cases it is actually best to not 
use COTS software, and that if it must be used, it requires considerable oversight 
into safety, security, and configuration management.  However, the actual technical 
treatment of the use of COTS software within the Software Safety Standard is very 
strong. It includes specific technical details for risk management and control over 
software quality and configuration that can be used to ensure that, if a COTS 
component or package is integrated into a safety-critical system, it can be effectively 
managed without negative consequences for the remainder of the system. 
However, although the NASA approach to COTS integration is commonly 
more conservative than the Naval approach, there are a few recommendations that 
PMs should consider in order to implement a full safety-critical risk-prevention 
system. The first of these is that serious consideration should be given to the 
concept that non safety-critical software should not be installed on safety-critical 
hardware systems or integrated into safety-critical software systems at all. Although 
the use of partitioning or firewalling methods can help prevent negative interactions 
between the software, it cannot prevent negative software-hardware interactions 
from affecting the functionality of the system as a whole. For example, if a 
commercial software package crashed and forced a reboot of a safety-critical 
system, it would be difficult to shield the safety-critical portions of the system from 
this reboot. Thus, the complete isolation of non safety-critical software packages 
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from safety-critical situations is the best way to ensure that these negative 
interactions do not happen. The third recommendation is that not only COTS 
software components, but operating systems, component packages, compilers, 
libraries, SDKs and languages should be considered to be COTS software, and 
treated as such for the purposes of analysis, integration, and version and 
configuration control. This classification will prevent a number of potential mishaps 
from occurring that could negatively affect the software package. Finally, the use of 
software version control and configuration control, in addition to gaining access to 
the software component code base if at all possible, poses a significant potential for 
dramatically improving the ability to maintain, control, and ensure the safety of the 
COTS software integrated into safety-critical systems. This control should be 
considered a basic operational standard, as it will provide a clear-cut way to control 
changes within the COTS codebase and make it possible for system developers to 
correct defects if necessary. 
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Appendix A. Forms and Checklists 
Checklist for Off-the-shelf Software 
This checklist is included in the NASA Software Safety Guidebook. It is 
intended to support in all OTS acquisition processes as a means of risk assessment 
and risk management, and should be applied with this aspect of the process in mind. 
The first three items are mandatory for applications in which there are potentially life-
threatening hazards (NASA 271). (The NASA Guidebook has a more detailed 
version of this checklist that includes specific technical details; this more-detailed 
version should be referred to for operational use).  




1* Have the vendor’s facilities and processes 
been audited? 
  
2* Are the verification and validation activities 
for the OTS appropriate? 
  
3* Can the project maintain the OTS 
independent of vendor support? 
  
4 Does software contain interfaces, firewalls, 
wrappers, etc? 
  
5 Does the software provide diagnostics?   
6 Any key products influencing choices?   
7 Has the software vendor been used before?   
8 Is this the initial version?   
9 Have competitors been researched?   
10 Is the source code available?   
11 Are industry standard interfaces available?   
12 Has the product research been thorough?   
13 Is the validation for the OTS software driver 
package available? 
  
14 Are there features that will not be used?   
15 Have tools for automatic code generation 
been independently validated? 
  
16 Can previous configurations be recovered?   
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17  Will a processor require a recompile?   
18 Has a safety impact assessment been 
performed? 
  
19 Will the OTS tools affect safety?   
20 Is the OTS being used for the proper 
application? 
  
21 Is there compatibility between OTS 
hardware and software? 
  
22  Does the vendor have ISO certification?   
23 Does the vendor receive quality products 
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